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Zero-bias Deep Learning Enabled Quick and
Reliable Abnormality Detection in IoT
Yongxin Liu, Jian Wang, Jianqiang Li, Shuteng Niu, and Houbing Song, Senior Member, IEEE

Abstract—Abnormality detection is essential to the performance of safety-critical and latency-constrained systems. However, as systems are becoming increasingly complicated with
a large quantity of heterogeneous data, conventional statistical
change point detection methods are becoming less effective
and efficient. Although Deep Learning (DL) and Deep Neural
Networks (DNNs) are increasingly employed to handle heterogeneous data, they still lack theoretic assurable performance and
explainability.
This paper integrates zero-bias DNN and Quickest Event
Detection algorithms to provide a holistic framework for quick
and reliable detection of both abnormalities and time-dependent
abnormal events in Internet of Things (IoT). We first use the zerobias dense layer to increase the explainability of DNN. We provide
a solution to convert zero-bias DNN classifiers into performance
assured binary abnormality detectors. Using the converted abnormality detector, we then present a sequential quickest detection
scheme which provides the theoretically assured lowest abnormal
event detection delay under false alarm constraints. Finally, we
demonstrate the effectiveness of the framework using both massive signal records from real-world aviation communication systems and simulated data. Code and data of our work is available
at https://github.com/pcwhy/AbnormalityDetectionInZbDNN
Index Terms—Internet of Things, Big Data Analytics, Zerobias Neural Network, Deep Learning, Abnormality Detection,
Quickest Detection.

I. I NTRODUCTION
Deep Learning (DL) has reformed the ecosystem of the
Internet of Things (IoT). On the one hand, they have been
successfully applied in smart devices for accurate recognition
of complicated inputs [1]–[3]. On the other hand, deep learning
models do not require high-quality features and reduce the
time-consuming feature engineering in conventional machine
learning schemes [4], [5]. As a representative technology
within the scope of DL, Deep Neural Network (DNN) classifiers aim to use hierarchically stacked convolution layers to
extract latent features to make accurate decisions.
Although DL and DNNs are successful in general purpose
applications, applying DNNs in safety-critical systems requiring assured performance is still controversial. Firstly, DNNs
perform well on known subjects but cannot distinguish unseen
abnormal data. Abnormal signals, such as cyberattacks, are
required to identify in real-time with constrained false alarms
[6]. Secondly, deep neural networks lack explainability, while
applications in safety-critical systems require making accurate
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decisions with known and explainable behaviors. Thirdly,
in safety-critical systems, classifiers are supposed to evolve
efficiently within a manageable behavior. The three obstacles
impede the deployment of DL and DNNs in IoT of safetycritical systems. Compared with DNNs, the nearest neighbor
matching algorithms naturally overcome these obstacles and
gain popularity in safety-critical systems.
To address the first challenge, existing works use deep
Autoencoders or Generative Adversarial Networks (GANs)
to capture the latent features of the domain-specific inputs
by compressing and accurately reconstructing them. However,
training deep autoencoders or GAN models is even more
computationally expensive than training DNN classifiers on
a specific domain. Moreover, autoencoders or GAN models
do not guarantee to respond in time with constrained false
alarms [7].
For the second problem, the eXplainable AI (XAI) has
been proposed [8]. However, most of the related works treat
DNN models as Black Boxes and focus on visualizing the
importance of input features, i.e., whether a DNN model is
picking the right features to make decisions and do not provide
insights on models’ performance boundaries. In safety-critical
scenarios, decision boundaries or interfaces to diagnose the
error risks are more important factors for assurability.
Finally, to support dynamic evolving DNN models, continual learning models such as Elastic Weight Consolidation
(EWC [9]) and Knowledge Replay (KR [10]) are proposed.
However, knowledge replay requires training old data generators, which is computationally expensive while EWC algorithms are efficient, but they are subject to numerical stability
issues.
In this paper, we utilize an enhanced deep learning framework based on our previous work [11], the zero-bias dense
layer enabled DNN, for quick and reliable detection of
abnormalities with assured performance. We use zero-bias
dense layers to facilitate DNNs with both non-impaired and
explainable performance in distinguishing known or abnormal
inputs and rapidly react to abnormalities with minimum latency and false alarm constraints. Furthermore, our solution
efficiently derives abnormality detectors from existing DNN
classifiers. The effectiveness of the proposed framework in
handling massive signal recognition has been demonstrated.
The contributions of this paper are as follows:
• We provide a novel method to use a zero-bias dense layer
to visualize and analyze existing DNN models’ decision
boundaries. With this approach, we can diagnose the class
boundaries of DNN models.
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We clarify the internal mechanism of abnormality detection in the zero-bias dense layer enabled DNN classifiers
and provide a novel method to efficiently transfer existing
DNN classifiers into DNN abnormality detectors with
assured performance.
• We combine our zero-bias DNN model with the Quickest
Change Detection theory, and our validation on massive
real signal detection demonstrates the effectiveness of our
integral solution.
Our research offers a solution to accurate identification
of abnormalities with assured performance, thus useful in
promoting trustworthy IoT and deepening the understanding
of deep neural networks. Besides, the success of the zero-bias
layer enables the move from IoT to real-time control.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: A
literature review of related works is presented in Section II.
We formulate our problem in Section III with the methodology
presented in Section IV. Performance evaluation is presented
in Section V with conclusions in Section VI.
•

II. R ELATED WORKS
Abnormality detection plays an increasingly important role
in safety-critical and latency-constrained IoT, e.g., the aviation
communication system in this research. Especially in the era of
Big Data, multisource heterogeneous data are generated timely
in huge volumes. Therefore, quick and reliable identification
and detection of abnormal events and abnormalities are increasingly discussed. This section covers the state-of-art from
three perspectives:
A. Abnormality detection in deep neural networks
A critical problem for learning based device identification
is that classifiers only recognize pretrained data but can not
deal with novel data presented during training. One intuitive
alleviation is to remove the Softmax function. In [12], the
authors first trained a CNN model with a Softmax output on
known data. They then remove the Softmax function and turn
the neural network into a nonlinear feature extractor. Finally,
they use the DBSCAN algorithm to perform cluster analysis
on the remapped features and show that the method has the
potential of detecting a limited number of novel classes.
From the perspective of Artificial Intelligence, this issue is
categorized as the Open Set Recognition [13], [14] problem.
In [15], the authors use the Generative Adversarial Network
(GAN) to generate highly realistic fake data. Then they exploit
the discriminator network to distinguish whether an input
is from an abnormal source. In [16], the authors provide
two methods to deal with abnormalities: i) Reuse trained
convolutional layers to transform inputs to feature vectors,
and then use Mahalanobis distance to judge the outliers. ii)
Reuse the pretrained convolutional layers to transform signals
to feature vectors, and then perform k-means (k = 2) clustering
to discover the groups of outliers.
B. Quickest event detection
Real-time event detection is a critical function in safetycritical IoT. From the perspective of input data, we may
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categorize them into single-shot and sequential detection
paradigms. In single-shot detection [11], event detections are
performed per observation, and the past data will not be
retained for future use. In contrast, the sequential detection
paradigm allows accumulating information from past observations [7].
From the perspective of the stochastic process, a CyberPhysical System in different states can be described by distributions with measurable statistical properties [17]. Therefore,
transitions within states cause the change of those properties.
The quickest detection aims to detect the change as quickly as
possible, subject to false alarm constraints [18]. The process
is essentially an optimization problem. Considering whether
prior observations are independent of an abnormal event’s appearance, the optimization scheme can be defined in different
forms as reviewed in [19].
We can also categorize the quickest event detection methods
into two branches: a) detecting events with known postchange
distributions. b) detecting events with unknown postchange
distributions. Generally, detecting known events is faster with
CUSUM algorithm can be applied directly [20]. A postchange
distribution may not be known in some scenarios in advance,
and nonparametric strategies have to be used and bring higher
latency.
Quickest detection provides a performance-assured solution
to detect change points (related to events) in sequential data.
However, the selection of statistic metrics still depends on
trial-and-error. We focus on real-time sequential detection of
events, especially on integrating the quickest detection theory
with deep learning to provide an automated and performanceassured solution to latency-constrained CPS.
III. P ROBLEM DEFINITION
The system model of our proposed framework is depicted
in Figure 1. We aim to use deep learning models to process
heterogeneous data from IoT and spot the abnormal data.
We then use the quickest event detection algorithm to detect
ongoing abnormal events with minimum latency.
In IoT systems, states are highly correlated with timedependent events, e.g., abnormal events or normal operations.
We define that abnormalities are suspicious data caused by abnormal events. Intuitively, abnormalities could trigger variation
of specific indication metrics. Analyzing the drift or variations
of these metrics, abnormal events can be detected sequentially.
Therefore, we can convert the real-time abnormality detection
problem into an online sequential event detection scheme, in
which a surveillance oracle can sequentially collect its target
system’s state signals or heterogeneous data denoted as:
X = {X1 , X2 , . . . X j . . . X j+m . . . }

(1)

where Xj denotes a state variable or record in vector form, an
abnormal event appears at j and disappear at j +m. Real-time
abnormal event detection requires triggering an alarm before
j + m with minimum assured latency.
Well-known methods are provided in the Quickest Change
Detection (QCD) theory. For example, in the Cumulative Sum
(CUSUM) Control Chart algorithm, a likelihood ratio test is
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A. DNNs with zero-bias dense layers
This subsection provides an extended analysis of the zerobias dense layer’s characteristics, which serves theoretic backgrounds. Additionally, we show that the decision boundaries
of DNNs with zero-bias dense layers can be visualized conveniently. Hereon, we will use the term DNNs with zero-bias
dense and zero-bias DNN alternatively.
We have discovered that the last dense layers of a DNN
classifier perform the nearest neighbor matching with biases
and preferabilities using cosine similarity in [11]. We then
show that DNN classifiers’ accuracy will not be impaired if
we replace their last dense layers with our zero-bias dense
layers, in which biases and preferabilities are eliminated. We
can denote the mechanism of the zero-bias dense layer as:

Time-dependent
activities in IoT
Normal

Abnormal
Records
Mixed
Records
records

Records
Records
Records

Heterogeneous
data pipeline

Deep abnormality detection models w. continual learning

Abnormality
detection

Quickest event
detection

Detection threshold

False positive

True negative

Detection delay

True positive

!!

False negative

Y 0 (X) = W 0 X + b

Fig. 1. System model of zero-bias deep learning enabled quick and reliable
abnormality detection in IoT.

(4)

L(X) = cos(Y 0 , W 1 )

Where g(k) is a sufficiency metric, P0 (·), P1 (·) denotes
the probabilistic density functions of abnormal and abnormal
states, respectively. A constrained cumulative sum of sufficiency metrics is used as an indicator, denoted as:

Where X is the output of the prior layer, a.k.a., feature
vectors. W 1 is a matrix to store fingerprints of different
classes. X is an N0 by q matrix, where N0 denotes the number
of features while q denotes the batch size. W 0 is an N1
by N0 matrix where N1 denotes the number of new feature
dimensions. W 0 X +b performs linear dimension reduction as
long as N1 < N0 . Finally, W1 is a C by N1 matrix in which
C denotes the number of classes, Please be noted that in W1 ,
each row represents a fingerprint of corresponding class whilst
in Y 0 each column represents a feature vector within a batch.
Therefore, the cosine similarity can be implemented by:

S(k) = max(0, S(k − 1) + g(k))

cos(Y 0 , W 1 ) = RU (W1 ) × CU (Y0 )

employed to sequentially process the observed data at each
timestamp k, denoted as:
g(k) = ln(

P1 (X k )
)
P0 (X k )

(2)

(3)

An alarm will be sent once S(k) is greater than a predefined
threshold, h. The CUSUM algorithm has been proved to
provide the lowest worst-case detection latency at specific false
alarm intervals. However, CUSUM-style quickest detection
algorithms can hardly handle high-dimension data, where
P0 (·) and P1 (·) are difficult to obtain. Even though some
works use DNNs to derive the sufficiency metric g(k) from
high dimension data, the DNNs’ uncertain responses when
encountering abnormalities make performance assurance a theoretic challenge. To enable deep learning for quick and reliable
abnormality detection, the following efforts are needed:
• We need a DNN driven abnormality detection model to
process complex data and provide theoretically assured
performance. If possible, the deep abnormality detection
model should be derived without a large overhead.
• We need to develop an efficient method to jointly apply
performance-assured DNN and quickest event detection
to provide theoretically guaranteed performance in detecting abnormal events.
IV. P ROPOSED F RAMEWORK
This section will first introduce the zero-bias DNN and its
application in the explainability of DNN models. We then
provide a method to convert zero-bias DNN into a performance
assured abnormality detector efficiently. Finally, we provide
our method to integrate zero-bias DNN with the quickest
detection algorithms.

(5)

Where RU (·) and CU (·) denote deriving column-wise
and row-wise unified (vectors’ magnitudes normalized to one)
vectors of the input matrix, respectively. Our prior results
[11], [21] also prove that zero-bias DNN can be trained using
common loss functions (e.g., binary crossentropy, MSE, and
etc.) and back-propagation mechanisms.
The cosine similarity in Equation 5 represents the similarity
matching of fingerprints and feature vectors on an N1 -D
unit hyperspherical surface. A 3-D example is depicted in
Figure 2. Fingerprints divide the unit hyperspherical surface
into several subregions, and we can reduce the dimension of
fingerprints and use Voronoi Diagram [22] to visualize their
decision boundaries as in Figure 3. The decision boundaries of
a specific fingerprint denote the boundaries of a class. Hereon,
we will use the terms class boundaries and fingerprint’s
boundaries alternatively.
Please be noted that, even if we eliminate the magnitude
and bias constant for each fingerprint, we do not need to worry
about the capacity of zero-bias DNN models in distinguishing
different classes. A numerical example for quantifying the
maximum theoretic number of classes that a zero-bias DNN
will reliably learn is given in Figure 6b. .
For example, in the DNN enabled MNIST handwritten digit
recognition [23], the network’s last dense layer is replaced by
a zero-bias dense layer with N1 = 10. The Voronoi diagrams
at two stages (85% and 97% accuracies) using fingerprints
in the zero-bias dense layer and feature vectors from the
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DNN with a zero-bias dense layer learns to project input data
from identical classes closer to the corresponding fingerprints
and separate data from different classes far away. The feature
extractors in prior layers and fingerprints in the zero-bias dense
layer are optimized simultaneously. In DNNs with zero-bias
dense layer, classification errors result from two perspectives:
• If fingerprints are not distantly separated, data from the
corresponding classes are highly possible to get confused.
This fact is verified in our previous work in [11].
• The prior layers are poorly trained and the feature vectors
are sparsely projected as depicted in Figure 3a.
Please be noted that zero-bias dense layer can be easily
adapted to existing DNN models via transfer learning.

Class A

Class X

Class B

Fig. 2. 3D unit hyperspherical surface in zero-bias DNNs.

validation set are depicted in Figure 3 with solid blue lines
representing the decision boundaries of topologically adjacent
classes. Please be noted that the Voronoi diagram can not be
applied directly to DNN models without adapting zero-bias
dense layers.
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B. Abnormality detection in DNN with zero-bias dense layer
The effectiveness of zero-bias DNN for nonsequential abnormality detection has been demonstrated in our prior results
[11], [21], briefly, it is significant better than regular DNN and
comparable to one-class SVM [25]. In this section, we deepen
our previous research and present a solution to convert zerobias DNN models into abnormality detectors with predictable
and assurable performance.
1) Deriving abnormality detector from existing DNN classifiers: In Figure 3b, feature vectors from known classes
are closely projected to the vicinity of the corresponding
fingerprints. As a result of cosine similarity matching, we
come to our first remark:
Remark 1. Abnormal data from an unknown novel class are
less likely to be projected into any existing classes’ close
vicinity as there is no specific fingerprint for these data.
We use the MNIST example to demonstrate Remark 1
with the results in Figure 4. We train the zero-bias DNN to
recognize handwritten digits from 1 to 8 and use digits 9 and
0 as abnormal data. The projection feature vectors of known
and abnormal data and fingerprints are depicted in Figure 4a.
We then replace the abnormal data with pure Gaussian random
noise (N (0, 2)) and repeat the experiment. Results are depicted
in Figure 4b.

20
10
0

20

20

0

0

-20

-20

-40 -20 0 20 40
(a) Abnormalities from unknown classes

-40 -20 0
20 40
(b) Abnormalities from random
noise ∼ N (0, 2)
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-30
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2
3

-40
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-40

-20

0

20

4
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7

8
9
Fingerprints

40
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(b) 97% accuracy
Fig. 3. The Voronoi diagrams of dimension-reduced fingerprints and validation set at different training stages. Fingerprints and feature vectors are
projected to a 2D space using t-SNE algorithm [24].

From the observation, we conclude that during training, a

Fig. 4. Voronoi diagrams of dimension-reduced fingerprints, validation set
and abnormal data. Data are projected to a 2D space using t-SNE algorithm
[24].

It can be noticed that abnormalities from an unknown
class of the same domain could be even more difficult to
detect than pure random noise. Although Figure 4a has shown
that abnormalities from unknown classes are more sparsely
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distributed in the unit hyperspherical surface, Remark 1 still
holds. Therefore, we can derive a basic principle (depicted in
Figure 5. ) to convert a zero-bias dense layer enabled DNN
classifier into an abnormality detector:
Remark 2. We can model the spatial distribution and boundaries of normal data in the hyperspherical surface. Then
the incoming feature vectors that are out of normal data
boundaries are regarded as abnormalities.

Fingerprints

Boundaries

Normal data

Abnormalities

Fig. 5. Relation of normal and abnormal data.

For a given DNN model with zero-bias dense layer, we
model the boundaries of different classes as follows:
Step 1: The training set is utilized to learn the boundaries of
known classes while the validation set will be mixed
with abnormal data (A0 ) to measure the performance
of converted abnormality detector.
Step 2: We pass accurately classified data of each known class
in C1 , denoted as KX i , through the DNN model
and obtain the compressed feature vectors before
fingerprint matching, denoted as:
Y 0 [Fn−1 (KX i )] = W 0 Fn−1 (KX i ) + b

(6)

Where W 0 and b are defined in Equation 4, F (·)n−1
denotes all network layers before the fingerprint
matching. Y 0 [Fn−1 (KX i )] denotes feature vectors
of accurately classified data in KX i .
Step 3: Calculate the centroid ci0 and covariance matrix (Pi )
of KX i as:
ci0 = mean(Y 0 [Fn−1 (KX i )])

(7)

Pi = cov(Y 0 [Fn−1 (KX i )], Y 0 [Fn−1 (KX i )])
Step 4: Calculate the Mahalanobis distances [26] from the
class centroid ci0 to all accurately classified feature
vectors. Then we use the maximum value as a cut-off
distance COi of class KX i :
COi = max Dm [Y 0 [Fn−1 (KX i )], ci0 ]

(8)

Where Dm (·, ci0 ) denotes the feature vectors’ Mahalanobis distances to ci0 .
Step 5: Abnormality detection using cut-off boundaries on
input data X) is formally defined as:
(
1 ∃ i, Dm [Y 0 [Fn−1 (X)], ci0 ] ≤ COi
D(X) =
(9)
0 Otherwise

These steps convert zero-bias DNNs into abnormality detectors with binary outputs. Herein, we will use the term zero-bias
abnormality detector alternatively. In essence, we construct
statistical models for each class to describe the distribution
of corresponding normal data and a hard cut-off distance to
form its boundary (denoted as dashed purple lines in Figure 5).
Please be noted that other distance functions or modeling
methods such as the Local Outlier Factor [27] can also be
applied.
Suppose that each fingerprint governs a non-overlapped
subregion with a maximum acceptable deviation angle, σ,
for normal data. This subregion is named σ-cap, we can
analytically evaluate the area of each σ-cap, and its occupied
area ratio, r0 (m), as:


m−1 1
1
,
Ac (m) = Au (m)rn−1 I(2rh−h2 )/r2
2
2
2
n/2
2π
Au (m) =
Γ(n/2)


Ac (m)
1
m−1 1
r0 (m) =
= I(2h−h2 )
,
(10)
Au (m)
2
2
2
Where Ac (m) is the area of a m-D σ-cap. Au (m) is the
surface area of the m-D unit hypersphere. Additionally, we
have r = 1 and h = r−rcos(σ). I and Γ are the regularized incomplete beta function and the gamma function, respectively.
A numerical result is given in Figure 6. As depicted, both
a smaller σ and larger number of feature dimensions (N1 )
increase the capacity and interclass distinguishability of the
zero-bias DNN. Moreover, even if we eliminate some information of feature vectors in zero-bias DNNs, we do not have
to worry much about their learning capacity and remaining
space for abnormalities, as long as feature dimension N1 is
large.
2) Theoretic performance Analysis: We introduce the hard
cut-off distances of fingerprints. Therefore, a binary abnormality detector converted from zero-bias DNN becomes a
binary classifier. We derive two important properties of this
type of zero-bias abnormality detector regarding false positive
and false negative rates.
The accuracy of zero-bias DNN models on known classes
can be obtained after training. As discussed earlier in Section
IV-A, the classification errors are caused by inaccurate projections. From the perspective of decision boundary and class
boundary, the scenarios that lead to classification error are
depicted in Figure 7. As depicted, the feature vectors C and
D are projected into the wrong class boundaries but out of the
boundaries of normal data. Meanwhile, E and F are projected
into the normal data boundaries of wrong fingerprints.
Suppose that E and F in Figure 7 are moved out of the
normal data boundaries. The false-positive rate of abnormality
detection reaches its upper bound and equals the classification
error α. Furthermore, if C and D are moved into normal data
boundaries, the false positive rate equals zero. Therefore, the
range of false-positive rate of zero-bias abnormality detector
is actually determined:
Remark 3 (Range of the false positive rate). Suppose that the
classification error of the zero-bias DNN is α, as long as our
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Remark 4 (Range of false negative (true positive) rates).
The upper bound of the false negative rate under uniformly
distributed abnormalities, equals to ratio of the occupied
regions’ area of normal data divided by the total surface area
of the unit hypersphere, denoted as:
PNc i
i=1 Shsp (N1 )
RUF N R =
Ahsp (N1 )
With F N R ≤ RUF N R , T P R ≥ 1 − RUF N R
(12)

Hypersphere coverage ratio / class

0.45
0.4
0.35
0.3
0.25
0.2
0.15
0.1

Where Nc is the number of known classes, N1 and Ahsp (N1 )
are the dimension and surface area of the unit hypersphere,
i
respectively. Shsp
(N1 ) is the surface area of normal data of
the ith class.
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Dimensions

(a) Coverage ratio per class

i
Analytically calculating Shsp
(N1 ) is difficult since the
shapes of these occupied subregions are unknown. Therefore,
we use Monte Carlo method to estimate RUF N R directly.
Corresponding pseudo code is presented in Algorithm 1,
specifically, we generate M random points uniformly distributed on the surface of the unit hypersphere and count the
ratio of points that are captured by the normal data boundaries
of fingerprints. The captured rate directly indicates the value
of RUF N R . Empirically, we set M = 20, 000.
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Maximum number of classes
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(b) Maximum of distinguishable classes
Fig. 6. The coverage ration per class and maximum number of distinguishable
class in zero-bias DNN.

Algorithm 1 Estimating RUF N R
1: function RUF N R (N1 , Nc , M, List[CO], List[ci0 ])
2:
HX ← U nif ormHypersphereRand(N1 , M )
Please refer to [28]
3:
chx ← 0
4:
for k ← 1 . . . M do
5:
for i ← 1 . . . Nc do
6:
if Dm [HXk , ci0 ] ≤ CO i then
7:
chx ← chx + 1
8:
end if
9:
end for
10:
end for
chx
11:
return
M
12: end function

.

E
C
Fingerprints

D

Class A and B

F
Class decision
boundaries

C. Zero-bias DNN for quickest abnormal event detection

Boundaries of
normal data

Fig. 7. Classification errors in zero-bias DNN, feature vector C, D, E and F
are erroneously projected into governing regions of wrong fingerprints.

statistical model can closely follow the boundary of normal
data, the false positive rate of converted abnormality detector
is less than or equals to α. Denoted as:
FPR ≤ α

(11)

Suppose that in a regular case, the feature vectors of
abnormalities are mixed with normal data and uniformly
distributed on the surface of the unit hypersphere, in this case,
the maximum false negative rate is reached.

1) Sequential formalization and detectability: Given the
theoretic analysis of zero-bias abnormality detector in section IV-B2, we can model the response of zero-bias DNNs
as switching between two probability distributions before and
after the appearance of an abnormal event, namely P0 and P1 ,
respectively. Since we have converted the zero-bias DNN into
a binary abnormality detector, we can formulate P0 and P1
into two Bernoulli Distributions [29]:
P0 (Ik ) = F P RkI (1 − F P R)1−Ik
P1 (Ik ) = (1 − F N R)Ik F N R1−Ik
= (T P R)Ik (1 − T P R)1−Ik

(13)

Where I ∈ {0, 1} is the binary output of the abnormality
detector with Ik = D(Xk ). F P R can be deried on existing
data, and the range of F N R and T P R from section IV-B2.
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As long as the P0 and P1 are different, the abnormal event
causing drifts from P0 to P1 can be sequentially detected. We
have the following determinant under regular scenarios:
Remark 5 (Sequential detectability). Abnormal events are
assured to be sequentially detectable if the binary zero-bias
detector’s true-positive rate (T P R) lower bound (1−RUF N R )
are greater than the false-positive rate (F P R) upper bound
(α).
Remark 4 shows that the true positive and false negative
rates are within different ranges, if 1 − RUF N R ≤ α,
the two variables’ spanning ranges are partially overlapped
(depicted in Figure 8) and we may encounter an extreme
case: T P R = F P R. Therefore, the abnormal event is only
conditionally detectable.

1

1
TPR

TPR

FPR
FPR
0

0
Detectable

Conditionally detectable

Fig. 8. Range of true-positive and false-positive rates.

2) Quickest detection algorithm: With Remark 5, we can
use Quickest Change Detection algorithm to detect the appearance of an abnormal event with the lowest latency at a given
false alarm run length. We will present both the Bernoulli
Generalized Likelihood Ratio Chart and its approximation,
the multiple Bernoulli CUSUM Chart, respectively. Compared
with the existing nonparametric solutions, we discretize the
continuous probabilistic function space and transform the
problem into a parametric sequential hypothesis testing problem.
Using Bernoulli Generalized Likelihood Ratio (GLR) Chart
[30] to sequentially detect abnormal events. We have:
Qk
T P RIk (1 − T P R)1−Ik
Rk =
max
ln Qki=τ +1
Ik
1−Ik
0≤τ ≤k−1,β≤T P R≤1
i=τ +1 F P R (1 − F P R)
"
Td
P R(1 − F P R)
= max (k − τ ) ln Td
PR ·
0≤τ ≤k−1
F P R(1 − Td
P R)
#
1 − Td
PR
+ ln
(14)
1 − FPR
Where Td
P R ≈ T P R ∈ [1 − RUF N R , 1) is the estimated
true positive rate of zero-bias abnormality detector and τ is
the estimated time when an abnormal event happens. Td
P R is
dynamicaly estimated as follows:
(
"
#)
Pk
i=τ +1
d
T P R = min B1 , max 1 − RUF N R ,
Ik
(15)
k−τ
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Where B1 = 1−ε is the maximum possible value of T P R and
ε is a tiny positive number to assure Td
P R < 1. An alarm is
triggered if Rk > hGLR and hGLR is a pre-defined threshold.
hGLR can be chosen as suggested in: [30]:
hGLR = log10 (ARL · F P R)

(16)

Where ARL is the average run length between false alarms.
Theoretically, we have to store a long sequence (0 ≤ τ ≤
k − 1) of previous abnormality detection results to detect an
abnormal event. Fortunately, we can use a sliding window to
store relevant data and reduce the computational complexity.
In [31] and [30], it is shown that a GLR chart with a window
is asymptotically optimal if the window size m is sufficiently
large.
It is also numerically verifiable that the detection latency
of Bernoulli GLR charts can be closely approximated with
a countable set of Bernoulli CUSUM Charts, where the
identical detection threshold hCU SU M is shared among them
and hCU SU M = hGLR [30], [32]. The approximated range of
T P R is covered by each CUSUM chart is:
T P Rmax · i2
(17)
Td
P Ri = 1 − RUF N R +
U2
Where U is the total number of CUSUM charts, in which
greater than 100 is recommended, i denotes the index of each
chart. T P Rmax is the max possible value of the true positive
rate that is less than 1. 1−RUF N R denotes the lower bound of
the true positive rate. Therefore, given an average run length
between false alarms, ARL, we have the worst case average
detection delay as:
T̄GLR = T̄ CU SU M ∼

hCU SU M
I(P1 , P0 )

(18)

Please be noted that we use the characteristic of multiple
Bernoulli CUSUM charts to demonstrate the properties of
detection delay.
V. P ERFORMANCE E VALUATION
In this section, we evaluate the performance of the proposed
framework in two folds, we first use a massive real-world
signal dataset to test the proposed method for visualizing the
class decision boundaries and feature vectors of a deep signal
identification network [33]. Then we use the proposed method
to convert the identity recognition DNN into an abnormality
detection model and evaluate its performance on sequential
abnormal event detection.
A. Dataset and application scheme
Our dataset is available in [34], we use the wide-spreading
signals from Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast
(ADS-B) system [35], which provides a great variety of signals
from commercial aircraft’s signal transponders with labels.
Specifically, each licensed aircraft use 1090MHz transponders
to broadcast their geo-coordinates, velocity, altitude, heading,
as well as its unique identifier to the Air Traffic Control (ATC)
center. The integrity and trustworthiness of ADS-B signals are
critical to aviation safety. However, the ADS-B system does

IEEE INTERNET OF THINGS JOURNAL, VOL. 11, NO. 4, DECEMBER 2020

not contain cryptographical identity verification mechanisms
and thus is vulnerable to identity spoofing attacks (depicted
in Figure 9). Our previous work shows that the responses
of the zero-bias DNN on known (learned) and unknown
transponders’ signals are different. Therefore, we can use the
methodology provided in this paper to design a performanceassured quick abnormality detector to detect signals from the
malicious masquerading legitimate aircraft.
From the perspective of Deep Learning, the input is the raw
signal from a Software Defined Radio Receiver (USRP B210)
and the label is the identify of the signal source (aircraft).
As in our prior work [11], [21], we take the first 1024
samples from the signal of each intercepted message. And
convert the 1024 samples into a 32 by 32 by 3 tensor, which
incorporate pseudo noise, magnitude-frequency domain, and
phase-frequency domain information, respectively.
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TABLE I
D ESCRIPTION OF DATASET
Usage

Description

Training

60% of signals, including 28 aircraft with more than
500 randomly selected raw records for each.

Validation

40% of signals, including 28 aircraft with more than
500 randomly selected raw records for each.
Validation data that’s not been used to train the
network.

Normal data
Abnormal data

80
60

Signals including 236 aircraft with less than 200 raw
signal records during the data collection period.

Class fingerprint
Class boundaries
Normal data
Abnormalities

40
20
The
malicious

This is aircraft A and
abandom landing

The
Legitimate

This is aircraft A
request landing

0
-20
Air traffic control
centers

-40
-60

Fig. 9. Identity spoofing in aviation communication systems.

Convolutional layers

-80
-80

-40

-20

0

20

40

60

(a) Accuracy 93.7% under polluted signals

The last dense layer
or zero-bias layer

Softmax

Input
data

-60

Results

100
Abnormality
detection
Direct pass through
Activated by Relu function

Class fingerprint
Class boundaries
Normal data
Abnormalities

80
60
40

Fig. 10. Deep neural network architecture.

20
0

-60
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The architecture of our DNN model is depicted in Figure 10
with a description of the dataset in Table I. In Figure 11 we
use two Voronoi diagrams to depict the relation of fingerprints,
class boundaries, normal and abnormal data, with the DNN
model trained under two scenarios: a) Input signals are polluted by abrupt spike noise due to the signal interference. b)
Input signal without abrupt spikes (removed by a Gaussian
filter).
As in Figure 11a and 11b, normal data are closely distributed within their fingerprints while abnormalities are
sparsely distributed over the feature space. It is interesting
to find that if the DNN model is with high accuracy, the
abnormalities are less likely to appear in normal data clusters.
The DNN signal identifier is with high accuracy within the
two scenarios.
According to Remark 3 and 4, the abnormality detector’s
performance is predictable. In reality, the zero-bias abnormality detector trained on noisy data has a true positive and a
true negative rate of 91% and 92%, respectively, which is
closely matched with our prediction. However, the zero-bias

10

-20

10

B. Decision boundaries and feature vectors in real-world
zero-bias DNN

-40

-80
-80

-60

-40

-20

0

20

40

60

80

(b) Accuracy 99.9% under filtered signals
Fig. 11. Voronoi diagram of dimension-reduced fingerprints and validation
set two different scenarios. Fingerprints and feature vectors are projected to
a 2D space using t-SNE algorithm [24].

abnormality detector trained on the filtered data has a true
positive and a true negative rate of 99% and 91%. The true
negative rate is smaller than the expected value due to the
model entering the early stage of overfitting. At this stage, the
training set’s feature vectors can no longer provide sufficient
information on the distribution of normal data. Therefore, the
estimation of normal data will be misled.
For alleviation, we can set a threshold value of accuracy
during training. We derive the cut-off distances, centroids, and
covariance matrices at this point. By setting a triggering value
of 96% for the validation accuracy on the filtered data, we
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get a true-positive rate and a false-positive rate of 98% and
95%, respectively. The relation between the performance of
the converted abnormality detector and the zero-bias DNN
model’s accuracy before conversion is given in Figure 12. As
predicted, when the accuracy of zero-bias DNN gets higher,
the normal data occupies a smaller amount of area on the unit
hypersphere surface, and thus produce higher True Positive
rates. Meanwhile, lower False Positive rates are achieved when
the zero-bias DNN has higher classification accuracy before
conversion as predicted.

metric

1
False Positive
True Positive

0.5

0
0.7

0.75

0.8

0.85

0.9

0.95

Accuracy
Fig. 12. Performance of the converted abnormality detector.
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(less than ten samples on average using GLR chart) as a
result of both high true-positive and true-negative rates. To
further evaluate our proposed method, we can use numerical
simulation results to demonstrate the performance of zerobias DNN, since its response characteristics prior and after
abnormal events are modeled as two Bernoulli distributions in
Section IV-C1. We experiment with a collection of possible
values of hGLR , F P R, and T P R that a zero-bias abnormality detector can encounter. In which T P R ∈ [0.6, 0.99],
F P R ∈ [0, 0.4] and hGLR ∈ [2, 20]
The relationship between abnormal event detection latency
and false alarm rate is depicted in Figure 13a. We discover
a nice cut-off property, in which the average false alarm
rate becomes zero as we select a proper detection threshold
hGLR or hCU SU M . After the threshold is properly set. Once
the detection threshold is greater than a certain value, 12
in our experiment, the detection delay grows linearly as
depicted in Figure 13b. A further analysis of the distribution
of detection delay with threshold hGLR ∈ [12, 20] is presented
in Figure 14, in general, as T P R/F P R gets larger, average
detection latency decreases with less sensitive to hGLR .
200

140
TPR/FPR = 1.5
TPR/FPR = 1.625
TPR/FPR = 1.75
TPR/FPR = 1.875
TPR/FPR = 2
TPR/FPR = 2.125
TPR/FPR = 2.25
TPR/FPR = 2.375

100
80

TPR/FPR = 1.5
TPR/FPR = 1.625
TPR/FPR = 1.75
TPR/FPR = 1.875
TPR/FPR = 2
TPR/FPR = 2.125
TPR/FPR = 2.25
TPR/FPR = 2.375

150

Detection latencies

Detection latency

120

60
40

100

50

20
0

0

0.2

0.4

0.6

0.8

1

6

0
1.4

1.6

1.8

2

2.2

2.4

TPR/FPR

Average false alarm rate / 10 samples

(a)

Fig. 14. Distribution of abnormal event detection latencies.

200
TPR/FPR = 1.5
TPR/FPR = 1.625
TPR/FPR = 1.75
TPR/FPR = 1.875
TPR/FPR = 2
TPR/FPR = 2.125
TPR/FPR = 2.25
TPR/FPR = 2.375

Detection latency

150

VI. C ONCLUSION

100

50

0
12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

Thresholds

(b)
Fig. 13. Abnormal event detection latencies.

C. Quickest abnormal event detection with zero-bias DNNs
Our model can detect abnormalities (the appearance of an
unknown aircraft’s signal) with almost neglectable latency

In this paper, we significantly extend the analysis of our
previously proposed zero-bias DNN and combine it with the
Quickest Event Detection algorithms to detect abnormalities
and time-dependent abnormal events in IoT with the lowest
assured latency. We first analyze the zero-bias dense layer and
provide to use Voronoi diagram to increase the explainability
of DNN models. We then provide a solution to convert zerobias DNN classifiers, which are easier to obtain, into performance assured binary abnormality detectors with assured
performance boundaries. Using the converted abnormality detectors, we model their behaviors using Bernoulli distribution,
which perfectly adapts to the Generalized Likelihood Ratio
based Quickest Detection scheme. In this Quickest Detection
scheme, the theoretically assured lowest abnormal event detection delay is provided with predictable false alarms. Finally,
we demonstrate the framework’s effectiveness using both massive signal records from real-world aviation communication
systems and simulated data.
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In the future, we will investigate the possibility of using similar methods to visualize conventional deep neural networks’
decision boundaries. We only use the Voronoi diagram in the
2D plane in this research, and better data dimension reduction
methods and visualization methods specifically focus on the
hyperspherical plane would be proposed.
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